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This study examines the usefulness of trader-position-based sentiment
index for forecasting future prices in six major agricultural futures mar-
kets. It has been found that large speculator sentiment forecasts price con-
tinuations. In contrast, large hedger sentiment predicts price reversals.
Small trader sentiment hardly forecasts future market movements. An
investigation was performed into various sentiment-based timing strate-
gies, and it was found that the combination of extreme large trader senti-
ments provides the strongest timing signal. These results are generally
consistent with the hedging-pressure theory, suggesting that hedgers pay
risk premiums to transfer nonmarketable risks in futures markets.
Moreover, it does not appear that large speculators in the futures markets
possess any superior forecasting ability. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
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INTRODUCTION
Commitments of traders (COT) reports that have been published period-
ically by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) since the
early 1980s detail positions taken by the three types of traders—large
speculators, large hedgers, and small traders in U.S. futures markets.1
The unique trader-position information has long been promoted by ﬁnan-
cial analysts as valuable for timing the market. For instance, Briese
(1994) argued that the COT reports could be followed much like SEC
insider transaction information to spot proﬁtable opportunities. The arti-
cle goes on to say that: “(C)ommercials are typically value buyers. When
their net buying is near its historical top, it is a tip-off that they think bar-
gains are available. When their net position reaches its lower historical
boundary, it usually means that they think tulip-mania has gripped a mar-
ket” (Briese, 1994, p. 20). Arnold (1995) stated that an understanding of
open interest by type of traders was crucial in futures trading, and pro-
moted how to ﬁnd high proﬁtability trades by examining trader positions.
Do COT reports contain useful information about future market
movements in futures markets? If the answer is yes, how does a speciﬁc
type of traders forecast market movements? How reliable is the forecast?
How to enhance returns by making use of trader position information?
What is the source of return predictability? Although the unique trader-
position information has been watched closely by market users, impor-
tant issues of whether and how the information may be useful for timing
the market have not gained any academic interest.2 The primary objective
of this article is to provide initial empirical evidence on the usefulness of
trader-position information for forecasting future market movements in
six actively traded agricultural futures markets—corn, soybeans,
soymeal, wheat, cotton, and world sugar. To investigate this issue, a
sentiment index was constructed for each type of traders. The main
difference between these and other sentiment indexes is that these index-
es measure investor sentiment based on actual positions taken by each
type of traders, while most sentiment indexes are based on the opinions
of ﬁnancial analysts and newsletter writers.
1The deﬁnition of large speculators, large hedgers, and small traders follows from the CFTC’s COT
reports. See also 8.
2The trader position information is believed to be important in modern days than before because it
provides an opportunity to spot the movement of large hedge funds, futures funds, and other large
players. William O’Neil, chief futures strategist of Merrill Lynch, made a comment that people are
watching this report much more than they used to because of the signiﬁcant increase in fund’s par-
ticipation in the market, and investors do not want to get caught on the wrong side of a trend when
the funds are moving in or out the market (Wall Street Journal, May 2, 1994).
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The study of the sentiment by type of traders based on trader actual
positions is important for three reasons. First, it allows for an explicit
analysis of the usefulness of trader-position information contained in the
COT reports. Second, it teaches us about biases in the market forecasts
of futures traders. Third, it enables us to earn extra returns by exploiting
those biases in agricultural futures markets.
The principal ﬁndings are that the sentiments of both large specula-
tors and large hedgers are valuable timing indicators in the agricultural
futures markets, but they provide opposite forecasts. Large speculator
sentiment is a price-continuation indicator. Contrary to popular beliefs,
large hedger sentiment is a contrary indicator.3 Small trader sentiment
hardly forecasts future market movements. Various sentiment-based tim-
ing strategies were investigated and compared, and the ﬁndings revealed
that the combination of extreme large trader sentiments provides the
strongest timing signal. The source of return predictability was also exam-
ined, and the conclusions drawn were that the results are generally con-
sistent with the hedging-pressure theory in which it is argued that hedgers
tend to pay risk premiums to speculators in order to transfer nonmar-
ketable risks, and that futures risk premiums are correlated with hedgers’
net positions. Thus, the contrary signal provided by hedger sentiment
roughly reﬂects hedging-pressure effects in futures markets. Moreover, it
was found that hedging-pressure effects tend to last for longer horizons
than what have been recognized and examined in the extant literature
(e.g., Bessembinder, 1992; De Roon, Nijman, & Veld, 2000). Unlike
Rockwell (1967) and Chang (1985), no evidence was found of superior
forecasting ability possessed by large speculators. Therefore, that specu-
lator sentiment forecasts price continuations simply indicates that large
speculators in these markets earn returns for the bearing of risk.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Several studies have investigated the usefulness of various opinion-
based sentiment indexes for forecasting returns in equity markets. Solt
and Statman (1988) found no statistically signiﬁcant relation between
the sentiment of investment newsletter writers and subsequent stock
returns. De Bondt (1993) found that individual investors surveyed by the
3Market analysts or newsletter writers argued that hedgers often sit on the right side of a market. For
example, Briese (1994, p. 20) wrote: “(I)f you follow only one market, the S&P 500 would be a good
choice . . . They (commercials) have shown an uncanny knack for spotting opportunities in the S&P.
Historically, a bearish signal has been generated whenever commercials held more short than long
contracts.”
932 Wang
American Association of Individual Investors (AAII) forecasted future
stock prices by extrapolating from price trends. Clarke and Statman
(1998) showed that the Bullish Sentiment Index hardly is useful for mar-
ket timing. More recently, Fisher and Statman (2000) studied the senti-
ments of three groups of investors—small investors, newsletter writers,
and Wall Street strategists—and found that the sentiments of both small
investors and Wall Street strategists were reliable contrary indicators for
future S&P 500 stock returns, but no statistically significant relation
between the sentiment of newsletter writers and stock returns was
uncovered. The above studies focus on return predictability of opinion-
based sentiments in equity markets. Sanders, Irwin, and Leuthold
(1997) investigated the usefulness of the Consensus Bullish Index for
forecasting returns in futures markets, and concluded that the sentiment
index hardly forecasts futures prices.
Based on causal observations and simple analyses in futures mar-
kets, Briese (1994), Arnold (1995), along with Apogee and other invest-
ment newsletters, argued that large hedger positions might be a useful
straight buying or selling indicator. The results presented here, however,
from a comprehensive statistical analysis of the six actively traded agri-
cultural markets, do not support this contention. On the contrary, it was
revealed that speculator sentiment provides a valuable straight buying or
selling signal. Hedger sentiment is a reliable contrary indicator, i.e.,
investors are advised to go short when hedgers are turning bullish, and to
go long when they are turning bearish.
This study also is related to the hedging-pressure theory that dates
back to Keynes (1930) and Hicks (1939). The hedging-pressure theory
views futures premiums as directly linked to hedgers’ net positions (e.g.,
Hirshleifer, 1988, 1990; Stoll, 1979). Hedging pressure results from risks
that hedgers cannot, or do not want to trade because of market frictions,
such as high transaction costs and severe information asymmetries.
Therefore, hedgers who use futures markets to avoid risks tend to pay a
significant premium to speculators for this insurance. Bessembinder
(1992) and De Roon et al. (2000) provided empirical evidence of hedging-
pressure effects in broad futures markets, although they did not attempt to
measure the extent of hedging pressure effects. Chang (1985) employed a
nonparametric approach to examine whether and how price movements in
three agricultural futures markets were related to the net positions of large
speculators and large hedgers. He found that prices rose more often than
expected on a random basis in months when large speculators had net long
positions and fell more than expected in months when large hedgers had
net long positions. Though it is not the primary interest of this study to test
the validity of hedging-pressure theory, a methodology, similar to that of
Rockwell (1967), was used to examine the source of return predictability
in agricultural futures markets.
METHODOLOGY AND DATA
Measuring Investor Sentiment
An investor-sentiment index, similar to the COT index in the market-
place, was constructed for each type of trader, based on current aggre-
gate positions and historical extreme values over the previous three
years. The sentiment of trader type i in market j at week t is measured as
(1)
where is the aggregate position for trader type i at week t detrended
using total open interest, i represents large speculators, large hedgers,
and small traders, respectively, aggregate position is deﬁned as long open
interest less short open interest, and and represent his-
torical maximum and minimum aggregate positions for trader type i in
market j over the previous three years.4
The investor-sentiment index, rather than net positions or excess
long (or short) positions, is chosen to study return predictability in
futures markets for the following reasons. First, the sentiment index is
similar in nature to other sentiment indexes in the market place, and
widely accepted by futures participants. Second, the sentiment index
provides a more-intuitive reading of trader actions than the number of
long or short contracts. Finally, this measure of investor sentiment
allows for comparisons of return predictability across futures markets,
while raw positions make the comparisons impossible due to the diverse
structure across futures markets.
Return Predictability and Investor Sentiment
To assess whether investor sentiment forecasts future market move-
ments, following Solt and Statman (1988) and Fisher and Statman
(2000), the relation between the level of sentiment of each type of
min(S jit)max(S 
j
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,
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4The max and min positions in a ﬁve-year moving window were also used as extreme values. The
qualitative results remain largely unchanged. To measure investor sentiment in the ﬁrst year, the
max and min aggregate positions were used, starting from 1990 and calculated from the bi-weekly
Commitments of Traders reports.
traders and subsequent returns in a futures market was examined. The
empirical model used is of the following form
(2)
where represents percentage returns in market j in the subsequent
nonoverlapping K weeks, K  2, 4, 6, 8, and 12, and i represents large
speculators, large hedgers, and small traders, respectively.
Unlike the studies in equity market (e.g., Clarke & Statman, 1998),
this analysis focuses on the value of forecasts in shorter horizons
because the life cycle of a futures contract usually is no more than 3
months (12 weeks).5 A positive slope coefﬁcient of eq. (2) suggests that
the sentiment of a trader group is a straight buying or selling indicator,
while a negative slope coefﬁcient implies that the sentiment of a trader
type is a contrary indicator.
Various sentiment-based timing strategies were examined. Following
the standard practice in empirical ﬁnance to study return premiums in
equity markets by comparing the returns of equally weighted portfolios,
sentiment of a trader type on its median was sorted into two groups: bull-
ish (above-the-median) sentiment group and bearish (below-the-median)
sentiment group. The mean holding period return in subsequent periods
was calculated for each trader type and the excess return of bullish sen-
timent group over bearish sentiment group.6 The mean access return
represents the average return for a strategy of simultaneously buying
bullish sentiment group and selling bearish sentiment group. If the mean
return for the bullish (bearish) sentiment group for a trader type is posi-
tive (negative), the sentiment of the type of trader forecasts price contin-
uations. Conversely, if the mean return for the bullish (bearish) senti-
ment group for a type of trader is negative (positive), the sentiment of
the type of trader forecasts price reversals.
To enhance forecast reliability, further investigations were performed
into whether the extreme level of investor sentiment provides a stronger
timing signal. To test this conjecture, the sentiment of a type of traders
was sorted into ﬁve groups, and focus was on the mean holding-period
R jtK
R jtK  a i
j  b  ji
 SI it
j  e   jit ,
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5The periods of 16 weeks, 20 weeks, and 26 weeks were included initially, however, none of the
results for these forecasting periods that are not reported here are statistically and economically
signiﬁcant.
6In this study, raw return rather than abnormal return is used because it usually is regarded that
futures trading does not require investment. Compared to securities markets, the term “margin” in
futures markets has a different meaning and serves a different purpose. Rather than providing
a down payment in equity markets, the margin required to buy or sell a futures contract is solely a
deposit of good faith. In addition, margin can be deposited in marketable securities that continue to
earn returns in equity or money markets. Therefore, it may be meaningless to calculate abnormal
return. See also Stoll (1979, p. 883).
return of the extremely bullish group (top 20%), the extremely bearish
group (bottom 20%), and the excess return of the extremely bullish group
over the extremely bearish group in subsequent periods.
The above procedure allows us to see that the sentiments of large
speculators and large hedgers are valuable for forecasting future market
movements, but they provide opposite forecasts. Therefore, it is conceiv-
able that combining the sentiments of the two types of large traders
provides a more-reliable tool for forecasting. Two sets of hypotheses are
formulated to test the usefulness of the combination of large trader sen-
timent for forecasting. First, the bullish speculator sentiment, together
with the bearish hedger sentiment, predicts positive futures returns,
whereas the bearish speculator sentiment, along with the bullish hedger
sentiment, forecasts negative returns. Second, extremely bullish specula-
tor sentiment, together with extremely bearish hedger sentiment,
predicts positive returns, whereas extremely bearish speculator senti-
ment, along with extremely bullish hedger sentiment, predicts negative
returns. These hypotheses were tested by assessing the mean return for
the group with (extremely) bullish speculator sentiment, together with
(extremely) bearish hedger sentiment, and for the group with (extremely)
bearish speculator sentiment, along with (extremely) bullish hedger sen-
timent in subsequent periods.
Finally, the source of return predictability in futures markets was
examined. The contrary signal provided by hedger sentiment tends to
reﬂect hedging-pressure effects in futures markets. That large speculator
sentiment forecasts price continuations is likely to represent either risk
premiums paid by hedgers, or superior forecasting ability of large specu-
lators, or both. A methodology, similar to that of Rockwell (1967), was
used to test the source of return predictability in these agricultural
futures markets. In particular, the hedging pressure effect was deﬁned as
the return earned by a hypothetical trader who follows a naïve strategy of
being long when hedgers are (extremely) bearish and short when hedgers
are (extremely) bullish. The return for a simple strategy by the trader that
is contrary to large hedger sentiment roughly measures the extent of
hedging pressure effect in the market.7 A positive mean return earned by
large speculators in excess of the hedging-pressure effect represents
superior forecasting ability of large speculators.
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7It should be noted that bullish hedger sentiment does not necessarily coincide with net long posi-
tions taken by hedgers, since observations with net short positions taken by hedgers outnumber
those with net long positions by hedgers in all markets except corn over the sample period. For
example, the number of observations with net short positions is 285 for wheat futures, with total
number of observations of 375. However, it is safe to conclude that extremely bullish (bearish)
hedger sentiment implies that large hedgers hold net long (short) positions in all markets.
Data
The weekly COT data on corn, soybeans, soymeal, wheat, cotton, and
world sugar futures markets over the period from January 1993 to March
2000 was obtained from Pinnacle Data Corporation (Webster, New
York). The sample period is chosen because of the nonavailability of
weekly data before October 1992. The six markets represent the most
actively traded agricultural futures markets that have been extensively
studied in prior research. The COT data include Tuesdays’ closing posi-
tions aggregated for all outstanding contracts by commercial traders
(large hedgers), noncommercial traders (large speculators), and small
traders.8 This information, published weekly on Fridays since November
1992, relates to closing positions on the preceding Tuesdays. Data also
was obtained on corn, soybeans, soymeal, wheat, cotton, and world sugar
Tuesdays’ settlement prices over the same period. These data are collect-
ed from Datastream International.
Table I provides summary statistics for weekly returns, sentiment by
type of traders, and correlation matrix between sentiment by type of
traders in the six futures markets over the sample period. Panel A of
Table I shows that the average weekly return in these futures markets is
rather small, with the exception of world sugar (in which the average
weekly return is 0.134%, or an annualized return of 7%). It is positive
only for corn and cotton futures. This implies that a simple trading strat-
egy of consistently holding either a long or short position would not earn
any signiﬁcant proﬁt in these markets. Panel B of Table I reports mean
investor sentiment by type of traders. The average sentiment for each
type of trader does not appear to vary signiﬁcantly across the markets.
However, the sentiment of the two types of large traders tends to be more
variable than small trader sentiment. This suggests that small traders, on
average, trade less actively than do large traders. From Panel C of Table
I, it is noted that the sentiments of large speculators and large hedgers
are highly negatively correlated, so are the sentiments of small traders
and large hedgers in the futures markets with the exception of wheat
futures. The correlation coefficients between the sentiments of large
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8Both commercial and noncommercial traders are those whose positions exceed the CFTC reporting
level (150 contracts, 100 contracts, 175 contracts, 100 contracts, 5000 bales, and 300 contracts for
corn, soybeans, soymeal, wheat, cotton, and world sugar, respectively, as of the end of 1999). In
order to be classiﬁed as commercial-trader category, the trader’s futures positions have to be taken
for hedging purposes. Small traders are those whose positions do not exceed the CFTC reporting
levels. Because a commercial position is one that is taken to hedge a speciﬁc risk, investors taking
reportable commercial positions are referred to as large hedgers, while those taking reportable non-
commercial positions are referred to as large speculators.
speculators and large hedgers are 0.89, 0.94, 0.93, 0.90, 0.89,
and 0.96 for corn, soybeans, soymeal, wheat, cotton, and sugar futures,
respectively. Small trader sentiment tends to vary positively with large
speculator sentiment for all except corn futures (in which the correlation
coefﬁcient is 0.06).
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TABLE I
Summary Statistics (1993.1–2000.3)
Panel A: Summary Statistics for Weekly Futures Returns (%)
World Agricultural
Corn Soybeans Soymeal Wheat Cotton Sugar Portfolio
Mean 0.009 0.028 0.032 0.079 0.013 0.134 0.042
Maximum 13.511 9.700 13.621 14.242 10.86 14.431 10.38
Minimum 14.867 19.906 20.593 17.658 33.55 17.316 7.809
Std. Dev. 3.274 3.013 3.457 3.496 3.623 4.319 2.196
No of obs. 375 375 375 375 375 375 375
Panel B: Investor Sentiment by Type of Traders
Large Speculator Large Hedger Small Trader
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Corn 44.19 28.03 52.78 28.75 40.92 26.84
Soybeans 48.70 30.55 52.92 27.17 45.90 24.50
Soymeal 49.77 27.98 49.42 26.84 48.59 21.73
Wheat 49.42 29.84 48.09 28.49 54.84 27.92
Cotton 42.31 29.34 41.41 25.84 58.88 27.48
World sugar 44.94 28.41 55.48 28.13 46.83 22.59
Panel C: Correlation Matrix of Investor Sentiments by Type of Traders
Large Speculator Large Hedger
Corn Large hedger 0.89 1.00
Small trader 0.06 0.29
Soybeans Large hedger 0.94 1.00
Small trader 0.49 0.73
Soymeal Large hedger 0.93 1.00
Small trader 0.64 0.80
Wheat Large hedger 0.90 1.00
Small trader 0.04 0.29
Cotton Large hedger 0.89 1.00
Small trader 0.35 0.27
Large hedger 0.96 1.00
World sugar Small trader 0.84 0.87
The return for the agricultural portfolio is the arithmetic mean of the six commodity futures returns.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Level of Sentiment by Type of Traders
and Futures Returns
Panels A, B, and C of Table II report the regression results of estimating
eq. (2) for each type of trader in the agricultural markets. To save space,
only estimated slope coefﬁcients are reported. Panel A of Table II shows
that the relation between large speculator sentiment and futures returns
is positive for all except cotton futures in the period of 2 weeks, and sta-
tistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level or higher for the forecasting periods
of 4 weeks, 6 weeks, and 8 weeks, except for soybeans and cotton futures
in the period of 8 weeks. Consider the relation between large speculator
sentiment and holding-period returns in the period of 4 weeks for wheat
futures, an increase of 1 percentage point in large speculator sentiment
is associated, on average, with a 0.07 percentage-point increase in
futures returns in the subsequent 4 weeks. The last row of Panel A
reports the results estimated with time-series data pooled across the six
futures markets. All the estimated slope coefﬁcients are positive and sta-
tistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level except for the periods of 2 weeks and
12 weeks. Consistent with the argument in Sanders et al. (1997), pooling
time-series data across markets increases the power of the tests. In addi-
tion, this approach provides a concise way of presenting and testing for
return predictability of sentiment by type of traders in similar markets.
The regression results for large hedgers are reported in Panel B of
Table II. Strikingly, the slope coefﬁcient estimates are all negative, and
statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level or higher for all except the peri-
ods of 2 weeks and 12 weeks. This suggests that an increase in large
hedger sentiment is associated, on average, with a subsequent drop in
futures prices. For example, an increase of 1 percentage point in hedger
sentiment is associated, on average, with 0.07 percentage-point decrease
in wheat futures returns in the subsequent 4 weeks. The results from
pooled regressions indicate that the slope coefficients are all negative
and statistically significant at the 1% level for the periods of 4 weeks,
6 weeks, and 8 weeks.
However, it does not appear that small trader sentiment is useful for
predicting futures returns. As shown in Panel C of Table II, all slope coef-
ﬁcient estimates are not statistically signiﬁcant. This is in line with the
evidence reported in Table I, that small traders tend to be passive traders.
In sum, the regression results show that large speculator sentiment
provides a straight buying and selling signal, large hedger sentiment is a
contrary indicator, and small trader sentiment does not predict future
938 Wang
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TABLE II
The Relation Between the Level of Sentiment by Type of Traders and Futures
Returns (%) in Subsequent (Nonoverlapping) Periods (1993.1–2000.3)
2 Week 4 Week 6 Week 8 Week 12 Week
Panel A: Large Speculators
Corn 0.005 0.044 0.084 0.092 0.063
(0.39) (2.14) (2.91) (2.12) (1.18)
Soybeans 0.001 0.019 0.031 0.028 0.012
(0.12) (1.79) (1.97) (0.74) (0.02)
Soymeal 0.006 0.028 0.056 0.043 0.031
(0.52) (1.80) (1.98) (1.74) (0.43)
Wheat 0.001 0.049 0.067 0.065 0.069
(0.22) (2.06) (2.14) (1.82) (1.29)
Cotton 0.008 0.021 0.056 0.013 0.037
(0.53) (1.66) (1.78) (0.67) (1.39)
World sugar 0.003 0.040 0.064 0.062 0.001
(0.16) (1.71) (1.96) (1.72) (0.01)
Agricultural 0.001 0.032 0.058 0.041 0.027
portfolio (0.10) (3.63) (4.28) (2.71) (1.03)
Panel B: Large Hedgers
Corn 0.012 0.050 0.090 0.110 0.082
(0.90) (2.37) (3.09) (2.23) (1.34)
Soybeans 0.008 0.024 0.039 0.032 0.011
(0.56) (1.72) (1.75) (1.74) (0.21)
Soymeal 0.003 0.028 0.052 0.042 0.023
(0.39) (1.77) (1.88) (1.68) (0.30)
Wheat 0.002 0.053 0.069 0.064 0.058
(0.11) (2.05) (2.01) (1.84) (1.09)
Cotton 0.021 0.024 0.031 0.029 0.061
(1.02) (1.78) (1.69) (1.66) (0.79)
World sugar 0.002 0.042 0.071 0.063 0.001
(0.09) (1.86) (2.11) (1.74) (0.19)
Agricultural 0.006 0.037 0.058 0.046 0.042
portfolio (0.93) (3.66) (3.86) (2.69) (1.46)
Panel C: Small Traders
Corn 0.011 0.012 0.023 0.015 0.002
(0.75) (0.51) (0.53) (0.29) (0.03)
Soybeans 0.001 0.013 0.021 0.030 0.019
(1.52) (1.32) (1.12) (0.95) (0.77)
Soymeal 0.003 0.025 0.033 0.034 0.009
(0.22) (1.05) (0.71) (0.61) (0.09)
Wheat 0.001 0.004 0.010 0.007 0.037
(0.38) (0.20) (0.26) (0.12) (0.52)
Cotton 0.013 0.012 0.046 0.014 0.011
(0.81) (0.47) (1.29) (0.28) (0.12)
World sugar 0.002 0.009 0.032 0.060 0.002
(0.10) (1.36) (1.21) (0.92) (0.09)
Agricultural 0.005 0.011 0.014 0.025 0.002
portfolio (0.77) (1.15) (0.86) (1.20) (0.07)
The regression results are from the estimation of eq. (2) with weekly observations. Only slope coefﬁcients are reported. The
numbers in parentheses are t-statistics under the null hypothesis that the relevant parameter is zero, computed using White
(1980) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.
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market movements. Therefore, in the subsequent analysis, attention will
be focused on timing strategies based on the sentiments of large specu-
lators and large hedgers in the periods of 2 weeks, 4 weeks, 6 weeks, and
8 weeks.9
Given the above results, it would be expected that bullish speculator
sentiment predicts positive returns, while bearish speculator sentiment
predicts negative returns. Conversely, bullish hedger sentiment predicts
negative returns, and bearish hedger sentiment predicts positive returns.
To test these hypotheses, large trader sentiment on its median was sort-
ed into two groups: H and L. H represents the group with bullish (above-
the-median) sentiment, and L represents the group with bearish (below-
the-median) sentiment. The average holding-period return for H and L
in the subsequent periods is calculated. Also calculated is the mean
return for HML, which represents a strategy of simultaneously buying H
and selling L. These results, which are broadly consistent with the previ-
ous evidence, are reported in Panels A and B of Table III.
Panel A of Table III presents the result for large speculators. The
mean return for H is positive for all except soybeans, soymeal, and
wheat futures in the period of 2 weeks, but is not statistically signiﬁcant
different from zero, except for corn futures and the agricultural portfo-
lio in the periods of 4 weeks, 6 weeks, and 8 weeks. The mean return for
L is negative, and signiﬁcant for all forecasting periods except the peri-
od of 2 weeks, and for all markets except cotton futures. For the futures
portfolio, the mean return for L is 1.01%, 1.22%, and 1.44% in
the subsequent periods of 4 weeks, 6 weeks, and 8 weeks, respectively.
This result suggests that speculator sentiment based on the deviation
from its median tends to provide a more-reliable selling signal than a
buying signal. The mean return for HML is positive and signiﬁcant for
all periods except the period of 2 weeks, and for all markets except cot-
ton futures (in which it is signiﬁcant at the 10% level only in the period
of 4 weeks).
The results for large hedgers are reported in Panel B of Table III. As
expected, the mean return for H is negative and signiﬁcant for all except
soybeans, wheat, and sugar futures in the period of 2 weeks. The average
return for L is positive for all except soymeal, wheat, and sugar in the
period of 2 weeks, and signiﬁcant for all markets except soybeans and
sugar futures. It is also noted that the mean return of selling H is larger
than that of buying L, with the exception of corn futures. Again, this
9The period of 2 weeks was kept in the subsequent analysis because, under certain circumstances, it
was found that the sentiments of large speculators and large hedgers had some forecasting power in
this short horizon.
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suggests that large hedger sentiment provides a more reliable selling
signal than a buying signal.10 The mean return for HML is negative and
statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level or higher for all periods except
the period of 2 weeks (in which it is significant for corn and cotton
futures, as well as the agricultural portfolio). Consider the agricultural
portfolio for the period of 4 weeks, buying L and selling H produce a
return of 0.73% and 1.13%, respectively, while a strategy of simultaneous
buying L and selling H gives rise an average return of 1.85%.
Extreme Levels of Large Trader Sentiments
and Futures Returns
From practitioners’ perspective, it is of importance to identify a more-
reliable and more-proﬁtable sentiment-based timing strategy. In this and
the subsequent subsections, certain sentiment based timing strategies
are examined, aiming at identifying the most-reliable and most-proﬁtable
timing strategy. The previous result indicates that the sentiments of large
speculators and large hedgers forecast futures returns. As an extension of
the result, it is expected that the extreme level of large trader sentiment
would provide a stronger market-timing signal. Specifically, extreme
speculator sentiment is correlated more positively with future market
movements. Conversely, extreme hedger sentiment is correlated more
negatively with future market movements. These hypotheses were tested
by sorting large trader sentiment into five groups, with focus on the
mean return for the group with extremely bullish sentiment (top 20%)
and for the group with extremely bearish sentiment (bottom 20%) in the
subsequent periods of 2 weeks, 4 weeks, 6 weeks, and 8 weeks. Let EH
represent the group with extremely bullish sentiment (top 20%), and EL
represent the group with extremely bearish sentiment (bottom 20%). The
mean return for EH and EL is reported in Panels A and B of Table IV.
Also reported is the return for EHML that represents a strategy of simul-
taneously buying EH and selling EL.
Panel A of Table IV presents the results for large speculators. The
mean return for EH is positive for all except soybeans and soymeal
futures in the period of 2 weeks, and is signiﬁcantly different from zero
942 Wang
10The evidence that the sentiments of large hedgers based on the median provide a more reliable
selling signal than a buying signal may not necessarily contradict the hedging-pressure theory that
does not specify this asymmetry in futures risk premiums. This is likely due to that fact that the
number of observations with net short positions taken by hedgers exceeds the number of observa-
tions with net long positions, except for corn futures. See also 7. Nevertheless, the evidence gener-
ally conﬁrms the previous regression results. In the later analysis,  more reliable forecasts provided
by investor sentiment were uncovered.
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for all markets except sugar futures, and for all periods except the period
of 2 weeks (in which it is signiﬁcant only for corn futures). The mean
return for EL is negative for all except cotton futures in the period of
2 weeks, and is statistically signiﬁcant for all forecasting periods except
the period of 2 weeks, and for all markets except corn and cotton futures.
Notice that the absolute average return for EH generally is larger than
that for EL, with the exception of soybeans and sugar futures, suggesting
that extremely bullish speculator sentiment provides a more-reliable buy-
ing signal than a selling signal. The mean return for HML is positive and
statistically signiﬁcant for all except the period of 2 weeks. For example,
the average return for HML in the portfolio is 3.22% in the period of
6 weeks. This suggests that simultaneously buying EH and selling EL, on
average, produce an average return of about 3% in the subsequent
6 weeks.
In contrast, the results for large hedgers reported in Panel B of
Table IV show that the mean return for EH is negative and statistically
signiﬁcant for all periods except the period of 2 weeks, and for all mar-
kets except cotton futures. The mean return for EL is positive and statis-
tically signiﬁcant for all except soybeans and sugar futures. Consider the
holding period of 4 weeks in the agricultural portfolio, the mean return
of selling EH and buying EL is about 1.43% and 1.60% in the subse-
quent period of 4 weeks, respectively, and the mean return of simultane-
ously buying EH and selling EL is 2.97%. It appears that extremely large
hedger sentiment is, on average, a stronger timing indicator than
extremely large speculator sentiment. This can be seen from the mean
return for EHML in Panels A and B of Table IV. The mean return for
EHML based on large hedger sentiment is larger in absolute terms than
that based on large speculator sentiment.
Combinations of Large Trader Sentiments
and Futures Returns
It has been shown that the sentiments of both large speculators and
large hedgers predict futures returns, but they provide opposite fore-
casts. A logical extension of this ﬁnding is that the combination of the
large trader sentiments may provide a more-reliable market-timing sig-
nal. This conjecture is tested using the two sets of hypotheses previously
formulated in the Methodology and Data section.
To test the ﬁrst set of hypotheses, large trader sentiment is sorted
on its median into two groups: C and D. C represents the group with
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bullish (above-the-median) speculator sentiment, together with bearish
(below-the-median) hedger sentiment. D represents the group with
bearish (below-the-median) speculator sentiment, together with bullish
(above-the-median) hedger sentiment. The mean return is calculated
for C and D in the subsequent periods of 2 weeks, 4 weeks, 6 weeks,
and 8 weeks.
The results are presented in Panel A of Table IV. Also reported is the
mean return for CMD that represents a strategy of simultaneously buy-
ing C and selling D. The mean return for C is positive and signiﬁcant for
all markets except soybeans and sugar futures, and for all holding peri-
ods except the period of 2 weeks (in which it is signiﬁcant only for corn
futures). As expected, the mean return for D is negative and signiﬁcant
for all periods except the period of 2 weeks, and for all markets except
cotton futures. The mean return for CMD is positive and signiﬁcant for
all markets and for all holding periods. The combination of large trader
sentiments appears to be a stronger timing indicator than bullish or bear-
ish large trader sentiments alone (see Table II). However, this timing
strategy may not necessarily be superior to that based on the extreme
large trader sentiments (see Table IV). For example, buying one wheat
futures contract when hedgers are extremely bearish generates an aver-
age return of 2.89% in the period of 4 weeks, while buying one futures
contract when speculators are bullish and hedgers are bearish gives rise
to a return of only 0.91%. Similarly, selling one wheat futures contract
when hedger are extremely bullish gives rise to an average return of
1.67%, while selling one futures contract when speculators are bearish
and hedgers are bullish gives an average return of only 1.26%.
The second set of hypotheses is tested by forming two groups based
on large trader sentiment: F and G. F represents the group with extreme-
ly bullish speculator sentiment (top 20%), along with extremely bearish
hedger sentiment (bottom 20%), and G represents the group with
extremely bearish speculator sentiment (bottom 20%), along with
extremely bullish hedger sentiment (top 20%). The mean return is calcu-
lated for F and G in the subsequent periods of 2 weeks, 4 weeks,
6 weeks, and 8 weeks. The results are reported in Panel B of Table V. The
mean return for F is positive and signiﬁcant for all markets except sugar
futures, and for all periods except the period of 2 weeks (in which it is
signiﬁcant for corn, wheat, cotton futures, as well as the portfolio). The
mean return for G is uniformly negative and statistically significant
for all markets except corn futures, and for all periods except the period
of 2 weeks. It appears that the timing strategy of buying F consistently
Investor Sentiment and Return Predictability 945
946 Wang
T
A
B
L
E
 V
C
om
bi
na
ti
on
s 
of
 L
ar
ge
 T
ra
de
r 
S
en
ti
m
en
ts
 a
nd
 F
ut
ur
es
 R
et
ur
ns
 (
%
) 
in
 S
ub
se
qu
en
t 
Pe
ri
od
s 
(1
99
3.
1–
20
00
.3
)*
Pa
ne
l A
: C
om
bi
na
ti
on
s 
of
 L
ar
ge
 T
ra
de
r 
S
en
ti
m
en
ts
 a
nd
 F
ut
ur
es
 R
et
ur
ns
†
2 
W
ee
k
4 
W
ee
k
6 
W
ee
k
8 
W
ee
k
C
D
C
M
D
C
D
C
M
D
C
D
C
M
D
C
D
C
M
D
Co
rn
0.
55
5

0.
42
6
0.
97
5
1.
84
5

1.
28
3
3.
09
4
2.
43
3

1.
70
9
4.
06
8
3.
18
4

1.
91
4
4.
96
2
(1.
72
)
(
1.
21
)
(1.
96
)
(4.
18
)
(
2.
57
)
(4.
58
)
(4.
18
)
(
2.
98
)
(5.
07
)
(4.
48
)
(
2.
72
)
(4.
87
)
So
yb
ea
ns
0.
10
0

0.
23
6
0.
33
5
0.
27
6

1.
24
7
1.
29
2
0.
31
5

1.
24
7
1.
54
6
0.
29
8

1.
64
6
1.
91
4
(0.
34
)
(
0.
98
)
(1.
42
)
(1.
25
)
(
2.
28
)
(1.
99
)
(1.
38
)
(
2.
29
)
(2.
01
)
(1.
55
)
(
2.
68
)
(2.
24
)
So
ym
ea
l
0.
28
6

0.
01
2
0.
29
9
0.
30
5

0.
59
8
0.
92
0
0.
35
5

0.
72
4
1.
02
7
0.
53
3

1.
01
5
1.
62
9
(0.
76
)
(
0.
03
)
(07
8)
(1.
69
)
(
1.
72
)
(1.
88
)
(1.
71
)
(
1.
77
)
(1.
99
)
(1.
74
)
(
1.
89
)
(2.
05
)
W
he
at
0.
00
3

0.
21
2
0.
21
1
0.
91
2

1.
26
0
2.
15
2
1.
21
3

1.
92
6
3.
08
8
1.
58
4

2.
49
1
3.
99
7
(0.
01
)
(
0.
68
)
(0.
60
)
(1.
65
)
(
2.
61
)
(2.
84
)
(1.
79
)
(
3.
37
)
(3.
53
)
(2.
03
)
(
3.
89
)
(4.
14
)
Co
tto
n
0.
50
5

0.
12
3
0.
62
7
1.
53
6

0.
50
9
2.
05
4
1.
63
9

0.
55
8
2.
19
2
1.
50
3

0.
58
8
2.
09
1
(0.
79
)
(
0.
37
)
(0.
98
)
(1.
89
)
(
1.
21
)
(2.
39
)
(1.
77
)
(
1.
10
)
(2.
01
)
(1.
68
)
(
1.
01
)
(1.
88
)
W
o
rld
 s
ug
ar
0.
05
7

0.
53
7
0.
59
1
0.
76
3

1.
84
4
2.
57
6
0.
74
4

2.
55
1
3.
22
2
0.
45
5

2.
77
4
3.
11
8
(0.
71
)
(
1.
16
)
(0.
96
)
(1.
57
)
(
2.
73
)
(3.
19
)
(1.
16
)
(
2.
94
)
(3.
12
)
(0.
59
)
(
2.
73
)
(2.
53
)
Ag
ric
ul
tu
ra
l
0.
05
2

0.
26
1
0.
31
2
0.
90
7

1.
11
7
2.
00
1
1.
07
1

1.
49
7
2.
53
5
1.
24
5

1.
79
1
2.
98
4
po
rtf
ol
io
(0.
32
)
(
1.
68
)
(1.
68
)
(4.
11
)
(
5.
29
)
(6.
74
)
(3.
88
)
(
5.
83
)
(6.
93
)
(3.
84
)
(
6.
00
)
(6.
94
)
Investor Sentiment and Return Predictability 947
Pa
ne
l B
: C
om
bi
na
ti
on
s 
of
 E
xt
re
m
e 
L
ar
ge
 T
ra
de
r 
S
en
ti
m
en
ts
 a
nd
 F
ut
ur
es
 R
et
ur
ns
 (
%
)‡
2 
W
ee
k
4 
W
ee
k
6 
W
ee
k
8 
W
ee
k
F
G
F
M
G
F
G
F
M
G
F
G
F
M
G
F
G
F
M
G
Co
rn
0.
95
3

0.
01
2
0.
96
6
3.
24
1

0.
72
5
3.
84
8
4.
87
2

0.
47
3
4.
90
3
6.
57
3

0.
04
2
6.
67
9
(2.
42
)
(
0.
02
)
(1.
22
)
(5.
79
)
(
0.
85
)
(3.
51
)
(7.
39
)
(
0.
55
)
(4.
56
)
(9.
30
)
(
0.
08
)
(5.
19
)
So
yb
ea
ns
0.
40
5

0.
13
7
0.
54
2
1.
91
0

0.
85
9
2.
31
2
1.
78
9

0.
52
2
2.
22
3
0.
88
0

0.
78
2
2.
12
2
(0.
92
)
(
0.
28
)
(0.
40
)
(2.
35
)
(
1.
68
)
(1.
79
)
(2.
14
)
(
1.
75
)
(1.
96
)
(2.
60
)
(
1.
85
)
(2.
51
)
So
ym
ea
l
0.
15
0

0.
44
3
0.
59
0
2.
18
1

1.
73
2
3.
70
6
2.
23
3

1.
90
3
3.
85
3
2.
23
9

1.
74
8
3.
63
0
(0.
25
)
(
0.
97
)
(0.
48
)
(2.
73
)
(
2.
69
)
(4.
43
)
(2.
26
)
(
2.
14
)
(3.
02
)
(1.
99
)
(
2.
12
)
(2.
38
)
W
he
at
0.
91
2

0.
54
3
1.
45
5
3.
11
1

2.
25
7
5.
36
8
4.
18
3

1.
69
8
5.
80
3
4.
82
3

2.
02
5
6.
75
8
(1.
67
)
(
0.
78
)
(1.
76
)
(3.
73
)
(
2.
54
)
(4.
60
)
(3.
85
)
(
1.
76
)
(4.
18
)
(4.
14
)
(
1.
98
)
(4.
71
)
Co
tto
n
2.
11
2

0.
71
4
2.
84
2
4.
82
8

1.
50
4
6.
31
9
5.
54
9

1.
99
3
7.
53
4
4.
21
2

1.
83
1
6.
04
1
(1.
76
)
(
1.
15
)
(2.
08
)
(2.
85
)
(
1.
72
)
(3.
95
)
(2.
34
)
(
2.
06
)
(5.
89
)
(1.
86
)
(
1.
71
)
(3.
01
)
W
o
rld
 s
ug
ar
0.
14
4

0.
82
2
0.
91
8
0.
90
9

2.
60
6
3.
32
4
0.
91
3

2.
98
6
3.
67
9
0.
77
3

2.
67
4
3.
17
1
(0.
29
)
(
1.
05
)
(1.
09
)
(1.
50
)
(
2.
31
)
(2.
85
)
(1.
29
)
(
2.
19
)
(2.
40
)
(0.
78
)
(
1.
81
)
(2.
01
)
Ag
ric
ul
tu
ra
l
0.
34
4

0.
42
3
0.
72
7
1.
95
9

1.
64
9
3.
37
4
2.
40
1

1.
62
1
3.
68
3
2.
82
7

1.
40
1
3.
77
8
po
rtf
ol
io
(1.
79
)
(
1.
68
)
(2.
28
)
(5.
86
)
(
4.
72
)
(7.
59
)
(5.
69
)
(
3.
90
)
(6.
69
)
(5.
52
)
(
2.
99
)
(5.
98
)
*
Th
e 
n
u
m
be
rs
 in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
 a
re
 t-
st
at
is
tic
s 
u
n
de
r t
he
 n
u
ll 
hy
po
th
es
is
 th
at
 th
e 
re
le
va
nt
 p
ar
am
et
er
 is
 z
e
ro
, 
a
n
d 
a
re
 c
o
rr
e
ct
ed
 fo
r h
et
er
os
ke
da
st
ic
ity
 a
n
d 
a
u
to
co
rr
e
la
tio
n 
ba
se
d 
o
n
N
ew
ey
–W
e
st
 a
dju
stm
en
t.
† C
 re
pr
es
en
ts
 th
e 
gr
ou
p 
w
ith
 b
ul
lis
h 
(ab
ov
e-t
he
-m
ed
ian
) s
pe
cu
la
to
r s
e
n
tim
en
t t
og
et
he
r w
ith
 b
ea
ris
h 
(be
low
-th
e-m
ed
ian
) h
ed
ge
r s
e
n
tim
en
t. 
D
 re
pr
es
en
ts
 th
e 
gr
ou
p 
w
ith
 b
ea
ris
h 
(be
low
-
th
e-
m
ed
ia
n) 
sp
ec
ula
tor
 se
nti
me
nt 
alo
ng
 w
ith
 ab
ov
e-t
he
-m
ed
ian
 he
dg
er 
se
nti
me
nt.
‡ F
 re
pr
es
en
ts
 th
e 
gr
ou
p 
w
ith
 e
xt
re
m
el
y 
bu
llis
h 
sp
ec
ul
at
or
 s
e
n
tim
en
t (t
op
 20
%
) to
ge
th
er
 w
ith
 e
xt
re
m
el
y 
be
ar
ish
 h
ed
ge
r s
e
n
tim
en
t (b
ot
to
m
 2
0%
). G
 re
pr
es
en
ts
 th
e 
gr
ou
p 
w
ith
 e
xt
re
m
el
y
be
ar
ish
 s
pe
cu
la
to
r s
en
tim
en
t (b
ott
om
 20
%)
 to
ge
the
r w
ith
 ex
tre
me
ly 
bu
llis
h h
ed
ge
r s
en
tim
en
t (t
op
 20
%)
.
outperforms the strategy of selling G, with the exception of sugar
futures, suggesting that extremely bullish speculator sentiment, together
with extremely bearish hedger sentiment, are more valuable for forecast-
ing future returns than extremely bearish speculator sentiment, along
with extremely bullish hedger sentiment. The mean return for FMG is
both economically and statistically signiﬁcant for all markets and for all
forecasting periods.
This result indicates that the combination of extreme large trader
sentiments, on average, provides the most reliable forecast when com-
pared to other alternatives. For example, simultaneously buying F and
selling G in the agricultural portfolio approximately give rise to an aver-
age annualized holding-period return of 18.9%, 43.8%, 31.9%, and
24.6% in the subsequent periods of 2 weeks, 4 weeks, 6 weeks, and 8
weeks, respectively.11 This return is, on average, larger than that for
CMD, EHML, or HML for a futures market in the relevant period.
Hedging Pressure Effects vs. Superior
Forecasting Skills of Large Speculators
We have shown that large trader sentiments forecast future market
movements. It is possible to question what explains return predictability
in futures markets. The ﬁnance literature postulates that hedger pressure
is an important determinant of futures risk premiums. The use of hedg-
ing pressure as an explanation of futures premiums dates back to Keynes
(1930) and Hicks (1939). The hedging-pressure theory argues that
hedgers in futures markets who wish to transfer nonmarketable risks
have to, and are willing to, pay risk premiums to speculators for the bear-
ing of risk, suggesting that positive returns should be earned for a simple
strategy of being long when hedgers are net short and short when hedgers
are net long. The results presented in this article generally conﬁrm hedg-
ing-pressure effects in the agricultural markets, namely, when hedgers
are (extremely) bullish, they roughly hold net long positions, and, there-
fore, the futures price is expected to fall in order to compensate large
speculators for taking short positions on the other side of the market, and
vice versa.12 In addition, it has been shown that hedging-pressure effects
948 Wang
11The annualized return is calculated by multiplying the holding-period return by 52 and then divid-
ing by the number of holding periods (in weeks). For example, the annualized return for FMG in the
portfolio for the period of 4 weeks is 3.374% * (524)  43.8%.
12Bullish (bearish) sentiment does not necessarily imply that hedgers hold net long (short) positions
(see also 7). However, extremely bullish (bearish) sentiment coincides exactly with net long (short)
positions in these futures markets.
tend to last for longer horizons (up to 8 weeks) than what have been
examined previously in the literature.
Furthermore, it may be interesting to ask whether speculators in
these agricultural futures markets earn higher returns than what have
been paid by hedgers, or equivalently, do large speculators possess
superior forecasting ability? To examine this issue, a methodology similar
to that of Rockwell’s (1967) was employed. Speciﬁcally, the hedging pres-
sure effect is deﬁned as the return earned by a hypothetical trader who fol-
lows a naïve strategy of being long when hedgers are (extremely) bearish,
and short when hedgers are (extremely) bullish. The difference between
the return earned by large speculators and that earned by the naïve trader
represents superior forecasting ability of large speculators. Let J(L) repre-
sent the group with bullish (bearish) speculator sentiment, and K(M) rep-
resent the group with bearish (bullish) hedger sentiment. The grouping of
bullish or bearish sentiment is based on the median sentiment. The mean
return of buying (selling) K(M) roughly captures the hedging pressure
effect. JMK (LMM) is a strategy of buying J(L) and selling K(M), and the
mean return for JMK (LMM) measures superior forecasting ability of
large speculators. In particular, a positive return for JMK and a negative
return for LMM suggest that large speculators tend to possess superior
forecasting ability. Similarly, let P(Y) represent the group with extremely
bullish (bearish) speculator sentiment, and Q(Z) represent the group with
extreme bearish (bullish) hedger sentiment. The mean return of buying
(selling) Q(Z) captures the hedging-pressure effect, which is the average
return earned by the naïve trader. PMQ (YMZ) is a strategy of buying P(Y)
and selling Q(Z). A positive return for PMQ and a negative return for YMZ
suggest that large speculators may have superior forecasting skills.
Panels A and B of Table VI present the evidence of superior fore-
casting ability of large speculators in the six agricultural futures markets.
Unlike Rockwell (1967) and Chang (1985), who showed that large spec-
ulators in agricultural markets (wheat in Chang’s study) possessed supe-
rior forecasting ability, no evidence is found of superior forecasting skills
of large speculators. A positive return for JMK and a negative return for
LMM only occur in soymeal and sugar futures for all the periods, but
none is signiﬁcant. The return for PMQ is positive for corn and wheat
futures for all the periods, suggesting that speculators may possess cer-
tain superior forecasting ability on the long side, but insigniﬁcant. The
mean return for YMZ is negative for wheat futures in the periods of
4 weeks, 6 weeks, and 8 weeks, but again insigniﬁcant. For the agricul-
tural portfolio, the return for JMK, LMM, PMQ, and YMZ is neither
economically nor statistically significant. This suggests that large
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TABLE VI
Source of Return Predictability: Hedging Pressure Effect or Forecasting Ability of
Large Speculators (1993.1–2000.3)
Panel A: Forecasting Ability with Bullish (Bearish) Speculator Sentiment*
2 Week 4 Week 6 Week 8 Week
JMK LMM JMK LMM JMK LMM JMK LMM
Corn 0.211 0.134 0.526 0.404 0.877 0.713 1.090 0.917
(0.46) (0.28) (1.07) (0.59) (1.07) (0.84) (1.15) (0.91)
Soybeans 0.096 0.135 0.069 0.121 0.001 0.059 0.198 0.264
(0.58) (0.32) (0.12) (0.21) (0.01) (0.09) (0.23) (0.33)
Soymeal 0.658 0.318 1.266 0.299 0.928 0.381 1.390 0.382
(1.36) (0.63) (1.50) (0.44) (1.30) (0.48) (1.39) (0.40)
Wheat 0.148 0.188 0.076 0.083 0.215 0.176 0.091 0.062
(0.05) (0.38) (0.09) (0.12) (0.22) 0.22 (0.09) (0.06)
Cotton 0.773 0.806 0.784 0.854 1.616 1.687 2.138 2.183
(1.25) (1.93) (0.87) (1.50) (1.53) (2.57) (1.78) (2.80)
World sugar 0.321 0.361 0.204 0.247 0.037 0.151 0.142 0.276
(0.54) (0.53) (0.26) (0.26) (0.04) (0.14) (0.13) (0.20)
Agricultural 0.064 0.037 0.140 0.119 0.377 0.347 0.499 0.470
portfolio (0.30) (0.17) (0.47) (0.41) (1.04) (1.03) (1.17) (1.19)
Panel B: Forecasting Ability with Extremely Bullish (Bearish) Speculator Sentiment†
2 Week 4 Week 6 Week 8 Week
PMQ YMZ PMQ YMZ PMQ YMZ PMQ YMZ
Corn 0.507 0.005 0.488 0.391 0.696 1.610 0.646 2.642
(0.95) (0.01) (0.69) (0.40) (0.84) (1.45) (0.63) (2.06)
Soybeans 0.157 0.212 0.259 0.187 0.014 0.352 0.404 0.545
(0.25) (0.36) (0.27) (0.23) (0.02) (0.36) (0.24) (0.48)
Soymeal 0.023 0.141 0.042 0.426 0.130 0.474 0.017 0.028
(0.03) (0.22) (0.04) (0.51) (0.15) (0.39) (0.01) (0.02)
Wheat 0.465 0.052 0.694 0.133 0.829 0.401 1.389 0.824
(0.63) (0.06) (0.81) (0.14) (0.74) (0.39) (1.07) (0.58)
Cotton 0.195 0.432 0.591 0.557 1.185 0.205 2.301 0.391
(0.18) (0.69) (0.40) (0.63) (0.61) (0.21) (1.06) (0.35)
World sugar 0.088 0.045 0.089 0.269 0.022 0.227 0.076 0.995
(0.13) (0.04) (0.20) (0.17) (0.02) (0.12) (0.06) (0.46)
Agricultural 0.062 0.006 0.035 0.207 0.178 0.389 0.315 0.591
portfolio (0.20) (0.18) (0.08) (0.48) (0.35) (0.76) (0.53) (0.98)
*JMK represents a strategy of buying J and selling K. LMM represents a strategy of buying L and selling M. J represents the
group with bullish speculator sentiment. K represents the group with bearish hedger sentiment. L represents the group with
bearish speculator sentiment. M represents the group with bullish hedger sentiment.
†PMQ is a strategy of buying P and selling Q. YMZ is a strategy of buying Y and selling Z. P represents the group with
extremely bullish speculator sentiment (top 20%). Q represents the group with extremely bearish hedger sentiment (bottom
20%). Y represents the group with extremely bearish speculator sentiment (bottom 20%). Z is the group with extremely bull-
ish hedger sentiment (top 20%).
speculators, on average, do not possess any superior forecasting ability in
these agricultural futures markets.
CONCLUSIONS
The actual position-based sentiment by type of traders was studied in six
actively traded agricultural futures markets—corn, soybeans, soymeal,
wheat, cotton, and world sugar. It was found that large speculator
sentiment is a price-continuation indicator. In contrast, large hedger
sentiment is a contrary indicator. Small trader sentiment does not have
any value for forecasting. Various sentiment-based timing strategies also
were examined, and it was found that the combination of extreme large
trader sentiments provides the strongest timing signal. This ﬁnding is of
practical importance for futures traders. The implication is that buying
when large speculators are extremely bullish and large hedgers are
extremely bearish, and/or selling when large speculators are extremely
bearish and large hedgers are extremely bullish in these agricultural
futures markets consistently generate both economically and statistically
signiﬁcant proﬁts.
The evidence that large hedger sentiment forecasts price reversals is
consistent with the hedging-pressure theory in which it is argued that, to
transfer nonmarketable risks, hedgers are willing to pay risk premiums to
speculators. Thus, hedging-pressure effects explain the return pre-
dictability in these agricultural futures markets. Moreover, the hedging-
pressure effects tended to last for longer horizons (up to 8 weeks) than
what have been recognized and studied in the literature. Further exami-
nation was conducted of whether large speculators consistently earn
more than what hedgers paid. It was found that it does not appear that
large speculators possess any superior forecasting skills. This result dif-
fers from the ﬁndings in Rockwell (1967), Chang (1985), and Chang,
Pinegar, and Schachter (1997) in which it had been shown that large
speculators tended to be associated with superior forecasting ability in
agricultural futures markets.
This study contributed to the literature in two ways. First, it exam-
ined the usefulness of investor sentiment based on trader actual posi-
tions for predicting agricultural futures returns. Second, it showed that
hedging-pressure effects tend to prevail in the agricultural futures
markets, and may last for longer horizons than those have been investi-
gated in extant literature. Much works remain to be done in studying the
determinants of investor sentiment and the value of forecasts based on
trader sentiment in other futures markets.
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